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　　提要：美國政治、經(jīng)濟風向已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)變：一是中期選舉后美國政治力量中心已經(jīng)從布什政府轉(zhuǎn)移到對中國存在根深蒂固反對情緒的參眾兩院，二是美國住宅市場衰退剛剛開始，并將傳播到其它經(jīng)濟領(lǐng)域，導致美國經(jīng)濟處于衰退的邊緣。但中國政府似乎對此未給予足夠重視，一方面正在精心準備與布什政府的高級代表團的戰(zhàn)略對話，另一方面認為經(jīng)濟增長宏觀動力轉(zhuǎn)變是長期目標，未給予足夠重視。

　?。ㄍ饽X精華·北京）宏觀動力轉(zhuǎn)變是長期目標，中國漠視外部風險

　　由于存在強有力的流動性周期及其催生的金融市場泡沫，全世界對于美國經(jīng)濟增長后勁不足還沒有做好準備。雖然中國經(jīng)濟看似不可動搖，但如果美國的變化引發(fā)全球經(jīng)濟的轉(zhuǎn)折，中國也難免不受到?jīng)_擊。

　　2006年即將結(jié)束，中國國內(nèi)的討論仍然主要局限于其自身面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。隨處可見的繁榮跡象和IPO引領(lǐng)的將要接近2001年初市場高點的股市，讓人們跟以往一樣保持著熱情洋溢的情緒。對于我們提出的調(diào)整經(jīng)濟增長驅(qū)動因素的想法——將經(jīng)濟增長的動力從出口和投資拉動向私人消費領(lǐng)域的傾斜，中國似乎僅僅是下了一些口頭功夫。中國政府認為這種轉(zhuǎn)變是市場化改革的一個長期目標。對于能夠看得見的未來，他們認為經(jīng)濟增長宏觀動力的變化是漸進的，有充足的時間去適應(yīng)。

　　美政治風向轉(zhuǎn)變，兩院反華情緒根深蒂固

　　我擔心更多外部環(huán)境的快速變化會令專注于內(nèi)部事務(wù)的中國感到措手不及。有兩種來自于美國的可能性是最令人擔心。第一種就是美國主導的貿(mào)易保護主義風險。中國正在積極準備12月14—15日在北京召開的中美兩國政府官員的雙邊戰(zhàn)略會談。由美國財長鮑爾森、美聯(lián)儲主席伯南克和美國貿(mào)易代表施瓦布率領(lǐng)的美國代表團成員包括商務(wù)部、勞工部、能源部、美國衛(wèi)生與公共服務(wù)部和環(huán)境部的部長。這是我所見過的解決貿(mào)易和國際經(jīng)濟問題最高級別的代表團。

　　這次戰(zhàn)略對話對于中國來說是件大事，因為長期以來中國一直擔心缺少來自國際社會的尊重。然而，這里面有一個重要的問題需要注意：中期選舉后，美國的政治力量已經(jīng)從愿意與中國坐下來談判的布什政府轉(zhuǎn)移了。中國還沒有完全掌握未來政治力量變化的重心以及國會內(nèi)部參眾兩院根深蒂固的兩黨連立的反中國情緒。根據(jù)我們的計算，2005年初以來，美國議員先后向國會提交了27項反華貿(mào)易提案。到2007年，其中某一項或許就會獲得國會的批準，從而成為法律，而這種可能性已經(jīng)越來越大。就在中國用盛大的儀式歡迎這些“大勢已去”的官員并且與他們坐下來談判時，美國國內(nèi)的政治氣風向已經(jīng)變了。

　　美經(jīng)濟處衰退邊緣，亞洲出口將受影響

　　另一種可能對中國產(chǎn)生外部沖擊的就是美國經(jīng)濟的緊急減速。美國是中國最大的出口市場——在過去的五年中占其直接出口的21%。如果加上從香港轉(zhuǎn)口貿(mào)易的數(shù)據(jù)，這個比重會更大。而且，出口幾乎占到今年中國GDP的35%以上。這讓中國成為當今世界對外依賴程度最高的經(jīng)濟體。然而，在2006年的最后幾個月，中國最大的出口市場美國的經(jīng)濟環(huán)境正在急劇惡化。

　　這不僅對中國是個大問題，而且對日本、韓國和中國臺灣這些亞洲地區(qū)其他對外依存度較高的經(jīng)濟體來說，也是個大問題。美國經(jīng)濟增長放緩將對這些地區(qū)產(chǎn)生“雙重打擊”：一方面是向美國的直接出口減少，另一方面是出口到中國然后在“世界工廠”進行組裝后再出口到美國的需求也將減少。由于缺少來自國內(nèi)私人消費領(lǐng)域的支持，以中國為中心的亞洲經(jīng)濟圈很難抵御美國經(jīng)濟的動蕩。

　　后一種情況需要進一步分析，因為大多數(shù)人對美國經(jīng)濟出現(xiàn)快速而突然的惡化可能持否定意見，在中國、美國和全球其它地方都是這樣的。然而，現(xiàn)在美國經(jīng)濟已經(jīng)顯現(xiàn)出經(jīng)濟周期下降過程中的典型跡象。當然，這一切都開始于房地產(chǎn)市場。

　　在過去的幾個月中，人們都認為房地產(chǎn)市場已經(jīng)觸底回升。單就這幾個月而言，自然總有一個月算是觸底。然而，10月份新開工住房的大幅下降，再加上已售出新住宅數(shù)量的下調(diào)和未售出住宅數(shù)量的大幅飆升，讓那些以為市場已經(jīng)觸底的人大跌眼鏡。房地產(chǎn)市場的啟動一定是與住宅建設(shè)有關(guān)，即新開工項目的啟動在先。而市場重新啟動前一定是先觸底，盡管目前可能市場還沒有到觸底的階段。接下來就是新開工項目減少所帶來的滯后效應(yīng)，包括建筑業(yè)及其就業(yè)、建筑業(yè)雇員收入、家具和電器需求、房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀以及食品產(chǎn)業(yè)的低迷。不過，即使新開工住宅已經(jīng)探底，美國住宅建設(shè)的衰退才剛剛開始。

　　此外，房地產(chǎn)引導的衰退很快會傳播到美國經(jīng)濟的其它領(lǐng)域。9月和10月連續(xù)兩個月的零售額和工業(yè)產(chǎn)出的下降不應(yīng)該被輕視。

　　人們認為，美國消費者總具備很強的適應(yīng)力，他們的支出即將走出低迷。然而，11月消費者信心指數(shù)再次下降、失業(yè)保險申請正在增加。而根據(jù)最新數(shù)據(jù)，今年3季度的個人收入數(shù)字下調(diào)了近1000億美元。這些動向令上述樂觀的看法不攻自破。但是真正的轉(zhuǎn)折是資本支出報告：10月份預(yù)期訂購和貨物發(fā)送計劃都大幅下降。資本支出長久以來被認為是偉大的“交接棒”，能夠有效的彌補房地產(chǎn)或者（亦可能是同時）消費領(lǐng)域的低迷。最近的數(shù)據(jù)顯示這個公認的交接棒已經(jīng)落地。其實這并不奇怪，因為資本支出一直以來就是一種“衍生需求”，它本身對資本使用的未來壓力的預(yù)期高度敏感。由于房地產(chǎn)和消費領(lǐng)域的前景極為動蕩，所謂的商業(yè)投資支出這個加速器也迅速通過10月份的資本貨物數(shù)據(jù)引起了人們的注意。

　　所有的這一切：房地產(chǎn)、消費、資本支出再加上3季度庫存數(shù)據(jù)的調(diào)高，顯示出美國經(jīng)濟可能處于五年來第二次泡沫后衰退的邊緣。在各類主要資產(chǎn)市場中，只有債市和匯市已經(jīng)意識到了這種可能性，因為債券價格攀升、美元疲軟。其他市場，尤其是股市和利差類金融產(chǎn)品市場，還完全沒有反映出這種風險。一旦這些市場意識到風險，將產(chǎn)生令人憂慮的影響。

　　經(jīng)濟增長依賴出口平臺，中國尚未為美風向轉(zhuǎn)變做好準備

　　所有這一切都距離忙碌中的中國非常遙遠。中國的經(jīng)濟增長使人印象深刻，以致于大家都認為繁榮是理所當然的。中國也已經(jīng)從長久的自我懷疑轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)樾判氖?。自信并沒有錯，它對于任何成功的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略都是一個關(guān)鍵要素。但是自信必須是建立在堅實的基礎(chǔ)上，才能為經(jīng)濟的持續(xù)增長加速。由于國內(nèi)私人消費難以起到支撐作用，因此中國的信心越來越依賴出口的強大帶動力和與此相關(guān)的投資高增長，而這二者都與中國出口生產(chǎn)平臺的不斷擴張密切相關(guān)。這就會造成一種危險局面：如果以美國為中心的保護主義浪潮升級，或美國經(jīng)濟急劇惡化，從而沖擊到中國經(jīng)濟增長的狹小基礎(chǔ)，后果將會怎樣？

　　中國并沒有為兩種情況的任何一種做好準備，世界上其他國家恐怕也是如此。

　　英文原文：Unprepared in Beijing
Taking its cue from a powerful liquidity cycle and the frothy financial market conditions it has inspired, the world is not prepared for a meaningful shortfall of US economic growth. That's certainly the message I take away from my final stop of the year in China -- whose seemingly Teflon-like economy would hardly be immune to a global accident made in America.

As 2006 draws to a close, the debate inside of China remains quite focused on its own internal challenges. At least, that's the tentative impression that emerges from the first two days of a three-day swing through Beijing. With visible signs of the boom literally everywhere you turn and an IPO-led stock market surging its way back toward the highs of early 2001, the mood remains as ebullient as ever. While the latest monthly data are flashing signs of a slowdown, you would never know that in meeting with key decision-makers in Beijing. The Chinese seem to be paying lip-service to the rebalancing imperatives that I and other macro types continue to stress -- the long-awaited shift from an export- and investment-led growth model to one that draws increasingly greater support from private consumption （see my just released Special Economic Study, “China’s Rebalancing Imperatives: A Giant Step for Globalization,” December 1, 2006）. Senior Chinese officials frame such a transformation as a longer-term objective of market-driven reforms. For the foreseeable future, however, they believe they have the luxury of time to cope with what they believe to be an evolutionary shift in the macro sources of economic growth.

I fear an inward-looking China could be blindsided by more rapidly changing external developments. Two such possibilities worry me the most, and they are both made in America. First, is the risk of Washington-led trade protectionism. Understandably, China is focused on the upcoming strategic bilateral talks between top US and Chinese officials slated for Beijing in two weeks time （December 14-15）. Led by Treasury Secretary Paulson, Fed Chairman Bernanke and US Trade Representative Schwab, and accompanied by Secretaries of Commerce, Labor, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Environment, this is as high-level a US delegation as I have seen that is traveling to deal with a major trade and international economic issue. This strategic economic dialog is a very big deal in official China, where the lack of respect from the international community has long been a source of considerable concern. Yet there's one key problem with the emphasis that China is placing on this mission: In a post-election climate, US political power has shifted away from the Bush Administration officials who will be sitting at the table with their Chinese counterparts. China doesn't fully grasp the significance of the coming political power change and the deeply-rooted bipartisan anti-China sentiment that pervades both houses of the US Congress. By our count, fully 27 pieces of anti-China trade legislation have been introduced in the Congress since early 2005. The odds are rising that one of them will become law in 2007. The political winds have shifted in America just as China sits down with great ceremony to negotiate with the "lame ducks."

A second possibility that could provide an external shock to China would be a sharp slowdown in the US economy. America is China's largest export market -- directly accounting for 21% of its total exports over the past five years and a good deal more than that if re-exports from Hong Kong are added back in. Moreover, exports are likely to exceed 35% of Chinese GDP this year -- making it, by far, the most externally dependent major economy in the world today. Yet economic conditions in China's largest export market -- the United States -- are deteriorating dramatically in the final months of 2006. This is a big deal not only for China but for other externally-dependent economies elsewhere in Asia -- especially the big ones like Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. These latter economies could well be hit with a "double whammy" in the event of a shortfall in US economic growth -- a reduction in their direct exports to America and a cutback in the demand for components they send to China that are then assembled in the "world's factory" on their way to the US. Lacking in support from domestic private consumption, a China-centric Asian economy is an unlikely candidate for decoupling in the event of a US growth accident.

It's worth belaboring this latter possibility -- only because most remain in denial over the swift and sudden deterioration in the US economy. That's true in China, as well as in the United States and elsewhere around the world. Yet there are now signs of cumulative weakness in the US economy that have all the classic manifestations of a looming cyclical downturn. It all started, of course, in the housing market -- the sector where everyone has been calling the bottom over the past few months. One of these months that call will certainly be correct. However, October's outsize decline in housing starts, together with downwardly-revised readings of new home sales and still sharply elevated backlogs of unsold dwellings, pose serious problems for the bottom-fishers. Keep in mind that any call on housing starts pertains to the leading edge of homebuilding activity -- the initiation of a new building project. Starts always bottom first -- even though they may not have done so yet. What comes next -- and this is the key for the macro economy -- are the lagged impacts from a fallback in newly started units that then depress subsequent trends in construction, employment in the building sector, the income generation forthcoming from such activity, the furniture and appliances that go into new homes, real estate brokers, and so on down the feed chain. Don't kid yourself, even if housing starts have finally bottomed, there's plenty to come in America's nascent recession in the residential construction sector.

Meanwhile, in contrast to what you hear from the "compartmentalists," the housing-led deterioration is rapidly spreading to other sectors of the US economy. Two consecutive monthly declines for both retail sales and manufacturing output in September and October should hardly be taken lightly -- to say nothing of mixed early reports by retailers for November. A renewed decline in consumer confidence in November, rising unemployment insurance claims, and a stunning downward revision of nearly $100 billion to personal income （mainly wage earnings） in 3Q06, belies the notion that ever-resilient American consumers are poised to come out of this swoon. But the real kicker was a perfectly awful report on capital spending activity -- with forward-looking orders and backward-looking shipments both sagging sharply in October. Capex has long been billed as the recipient of the great "baton pass" -- the sector that would seamlessly pick up the slack in the event of a downturn in housing and/ or consumption. The latest data suggest the proverbial baton may have been dropped -- hardly surprising, in my view, since capital spending has long behaved as a "derived demand" that is highly sensitive to expectations of future pressures on capacity utilization. With the housing and consumption outlooks shaky at best, the so-called accelerator models of business capital spending are flashing precisely the type of caution that the October data on capital goods conveyed.

Adding it all up -- housing, consumption, capex, together with an upward revision to 3Q06 inventory building -- and the US economy may be on the brink of its second post-bubble recession in five years. A surging bond market and a weaker dollar appear to be alone among major asset classes in figuring this out. I continue to fear the implications of that realization for other markets -- especially equities and spread products, which remain priced for the veritable absence of any risk.

All this is a long way away from the hustle and bustle of Beijing. China's performance has been so impressive for so long that I sense a growing tendency to take the boom for granted. Reflecting this belief, I am starting to detect an important shift in the Chinese mood, with long-entrenched feelings of self-doubt now giving way to a new-found confidence. There's nothing wrong with confidence -- it can be a critical element of any successful economic development strategy. But confidence must be on solid ground to fuel sustainable growth. Lacking in support from internal private consumption, the Chinese confidence factor is increasingly dependent on a powerful export-led growth dynamic and associated gains in fixed investment -- both very much tied to the open-ended expansion of China's outward-looking export production platform. This could turn into a surprisingly precarious situation. What happens if the narrow underpinnings of China's growth strategy are undermined by the twin surprises of Washington-led protectionism and a sudden deterioration in the US economy? Beijing is unprepared for either of those possibilities -- as is, I'm afraid, the rest of the world.


來源：摩根斯坦利，2006.12.1，作者：Stephen S. Roach

信息來源：中國經(jīng)濟網(wǎng)